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Abstract
Violence in modern Africa is still often explained in the West as a result of 
persistent primitivism and tribalism in African cultures.  This culturalist view of 
African conflict appears in some scholarly work as well as in much of popular 
culture, including the media.  What such analysis misses is that European 
colonialism in Africa fostered non-modern, ethnically based societies through 
indirect rule, and post-colonial governments have largely relied on versions of 
the colonial system to maintain their power.  Moreover, interventions by the West
in post-colonial African affairs have only infrequently helped to reduce ethnic 
tensions.  More commonly, Western intervention has been ineffective and self-
serving and Western governments have been able to obscure their actions 
because of popular ignorance of African culture and history.  African tribalism is 
real, but it is much more a result of modern historical events than age-old 
hatreds.  Greater understanding of African history and culture and greater care 
for Africa can result in reduction of ethnic violence.
Of all the regions of the contemporary world, the one most commonly associated 
with violence is Sub-Saharan Africa.  It doesn’t take much effort to name ten, twenty, or 
even thirty recent African civil wars, genocides, coups, riots, interstate conflicts, and 
political murders (South Africa, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Zaire/Congo, Zimbabwe…) and despite recent gains for democracy, regimes that 
maintain power through force are still common.  It comes as no surprise, then, that the 
first four cases of the International Criminal Court, founded on 1 July 2002 and dealing 
only with incidents occurring since that date, were related to Africa: Congo (DRC), 
Uganda, Sudan, and Central African Republic.  Likewise, it does not surprise us that 
indicators of poverty, injustice, and failed states are found widely among Sub-Saharan 
African countries.1
How should we account for the physical and structural violence in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and what can be done?  Below I discuss two ways that are sometimes opposed in 
explaining African violence: culture and history.  It is tragic that “traditional culture” 
persists in the West as a primary explanation for African violence.  If violence is 
primarily cultural in origin and if cultures are age-old, deep, and immutable, then we can 
conclude that there is little that can or ought to be done to resolve Africa’s conflicts.  In 
such a case the proper response might justify isolation, neglect, or benign management of
conflict.  But if culture responds to history then we might take it as our responsibility to 
work with Africans to find cultural and historical solutions to violence.  Culture is, in 
fact, responsive to events even if it is persistent, and caring outsiders can assist in 
resolution of African conflict if they improve their knowledge of culture and history. 
Little more than half a century ago, a third explanation for African violence, 
biology, would have been debated seriously.  The overt racism of the first half of the 
twentieth century is more or less behind us, but one suspects that some violence in Africa
goes unaddressed because of covert racism.  It is difficult to know, because one of the 
tenets of racism is that biology determines culture: inferior biology, inferior culture.  In 
the racist era, black Africans were deemed less evolved and therefore biologically and 
culturally similar to children, or, in Kipling’s well-known verse, “half-devil and half-
child.”  Until the 1950s, virtually every Western academic discipline except anthropology
adduced “facts” about inferior African culture that demonstrated African biological 
inferiority.2  Thus some of today’s cultural arguments about the inferiority of African 
culture sound eerily similar to racist arguments and may disguise actual racism.
***
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The cultural argument for the behavior of civilizations is most famously and 
broadly drawn by Samuel P. Huntington who proposes that the post-colonial, post Cold 
War world is typified by the reemergence of seven ancient civilizations characterized by 
common values and languages:  Western, Latin American, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, 
Orthodox, and Japanese.  In the wake of the supposed Western victory in the Cold War 
and Western triumphalism, Huntington argued that belief in the universality of Western 
values was “false, immoral, and dangerous.”3  For Huntington, cultures were so persistent
that they resisted Westernization (although not necessarily modernization), and thus 
competition between civilizations would be the most notable feature of the coming world 
order rather than the so-called end of history.  Huntington’s delineation of civilizations 
was imprecise, but he identified the Sinic and Islamic civilizations as being the most 
important challengers to the West.  As for Sub-Saharan Africa, it is only a “possible 
civilization,” because it doesn’t have a common linguistic or religious heritage.  It is, 
rather, a collection of cultures, of tribes.  “Tribal loyalties,” said Huntington, “are 
pervasive and intense,” and the major source of persistent violent conflict.4  Conflict over
resources and power can be negotiated, but conflict over culture cannot.  It is “human to 
hate,” Huntington added, and people need enemies to define and motivate themselves.5  
For Huntington, Africa’s ancient cultural divisions make violence inevitable.
Post Cold War anxiety produced other culturalist interpretations of Africa’s 
violence.  In a widely read article, “The Coming Anarchy,” Robert Kaplan warned of a 
future world of “scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease,”6 not long before 
the publication of Huntington’s book.  Kaplan pointed to the horrific violence in Sierra 
Leone and Côte d’Ivoire as evidence that African civilization would be the first to 
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crumble.  He noted that in Africa, animism, polygyny (leading to overpopulation), and 
the reciprocity expectations of communal living, provide “a weak shield against the 
corrosive social effects of life in cities.”7  Thus African violence can be understood as a 
defect in African culture.
Despite the fact that Huntington and Kaplan frame their arguments historically—
as the reemergence of civilizations or the result of growing scarcity, overpopulation, and 
urbanization—they can be classified as culturalists because they view so-called culture 
rather than, say, reason or experience of the world, as the key to human action, and as 
more or less immutable.  Huntington says that the West cannot expect other civilizations 
to adopt or even respect the universalist vision of Western civilization.  Thus by insisting 
on the universal applicability of its values, such as individualism and democracy, the 
West is more likely to irritate than to reform other civilizations.  Kaplan writes that 
African culture is the weakest of global cultures and therefore “the symbol of worldwide 
demographic, environmental, and societal stress.”8  
Since making their arguments in the 1990s, both authors extended them 
frequently, and their continuing commitment to culture has been evident in their 
arguments for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan  (Huntington died in 2008).  Kaplan, 
indeed, has typified the non-modern parts of the world as “injun country” (Indian 
country, referring to America’s violent conquest of its west) and has recommended a 
culturalist response, that the West adopt a “pagan morality” of retribution, conquest, and 
Realpolitik in place of the softer Judeo-Christian morality.9
Huntington also co-edited a volume of essays, Culture Matters, which mainly 
supports the culturalist position toward the modern world.  In that collection, a 
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remarkable essay asks, “Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?”  Author 
Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, a Cameroonian scholar, answers a vociferous yes:  “…we 
can no longer reasonably blame the colonial powers for our condition.”  Nor can Africans
blame post-colonial actions by the West.  Rather, Africa needs to question its culture, 
which, despite belonging to fifty countries, has a generally common core.  That core, says
Etounga-Manguelle, is characterized by i) hierarchical distance (an elite distant from 
commoners because commoners can survive without elites in the salubrious tropical 
environment), ii) security in uncertainty (lack of concern for tomorrow because of 
African religion), iii) tyranny of time (the past will repeat itself; no need to plan for a 
different life), iv) indivisible power and authority (jealousy in interpersonal relations 
aimed at preventing change in social status; you must be born with power or seize it, 
rather than earn it), v) the community dominates the individual (there is no operative set 
of individual rights and responsibilities), vi) excessive conviviality and rejection of open 
conflict, vii) inefficient homo economicus (except for a very few well-known ethnic 
groups), viii) high costs of irrationalism (everyone who is successful has a witch doctor 
or sorcerer), ix) cannibalistic and totalitarian societies (metaphorically, Africa eats itself).
Etounga-Manguelle concludes by urging Africa to keep its valuable humanistic culture 
while “moving into modernism” through education.10  Etounga-Manguelle provides hope 
for change, but his arguments rely on essentializing African culture and placing its 
present in the pre-colonial past.  This is culturalism.  It is also the basis of tribalism as 
practiced by Africans who essentialize other ethnic groups.11
There is a fertile American field in which such culturalist arguments can flourish. 
Modern American popular culture is littered with evolutionist ideas about Western 
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exceptionalism and progress and African primitivism and backwardness.  News reports, 
documentaries, advertisements, movies, amusement parks, mission literature, and other 
forms of popular culture focus on exotic Africa, wild Africa, troubled Africa, helpless 
Africa, unchanging Africa, and so forth.12  News reports still frequently imply that 
Africa’s conflicts are caused by so-called traditional cultures.13  Most commonly, 
tribalism and racism are blamed for the inability of Africans to overcome African 
violence.14  This is seen clearly in the reports of genocide in Rwanda and of north-south 
conflicts across the Sahel (desert edge) and Sudan (grasslands) stretching from Senegal to
the country of Sudan.  This violence, we are told, results from age-old hatreds between 
tribes, or from racial animosity between long-resident farmers and racially distinct 
newcomers.   Indeed, everywhere one looks in Africa there are conflicts that are 
explained in the West by tribalism and racism:  Rwanda (Tutsi/Nilotes-Hutu/Bantu), 
Sudan (Arabs-Fur/African), South Africa (white-black, Zulu-Xhosa), Kenya (Bantu-
Nilotic, Kikuyu-Kamba-Luo-Kalenjin),  Nigeria (Hausa-Yoruba-Igbo), Congo (Kongo-
Luba-Lendu-Hema-etc.), and so on. 
It is not that such culturalist interpretations are completely ahistorical, for they 
almost always place African actors in an historical context.  Rather, they presume that 
actors are guided primarily by their culture, which is assumed to be ancient, parochial, 
and immutable.  It is culture itself that is understood ahistorically.  
***
This culturalist argument has recently been strongly challenged by a more 
historical argument for the causes of African violence in the work of political scientist 
Mahmood Mamdani.  Mamdani, who grew up in Uganda, believes that European 
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colonialism in Africa deeply shaped African history and resulted in the tribalism, tyranny,
underdevelopment, and violence we see today.  For Mamdani, African conflicts are 
primarily historical and political, rather than cultural, and cannot be resolved unless they 
are understood as such.  His most recent work, Saviors and Survivors. Darfur, Politics, 
and the War on Terror, is illustrative.15  Trying to comprehend the recent violence in 
Darfur, Mamdani does not describe Fur, Arab, or Janjawiid culture, but recounts the 
political history of Sudan and Darfur.  While that history, as told by Mamdani, is much 
more complex than can be quickly or adequately summarized here, a few points can give 
the reader a sense of how Mamdani understands the Darfur violence.
Mamdani begins with the fact that so-called Arabs in Sudan are not immigrants 
from Southwest Asia but rather local peoples who have converted to Islam over centuries 
and invented lineages that link them to prestigious Arab families.  During the colonial 
era, the British fostered the idea of Sudanese Arabs as immigrants and settlers, and hence 
a separate race, because the British thought according to racial divisions and because it 
served their divide-and-conquer policies.  In the region of Darfur, the British also sought 
to fragment the centralizing successes of a seventeenth and eighteenth century African 
empire.  Thus the British “retribalized” Darfur as well as the rest of Sudan.  In Darfur, the
British further distinguished between “natives” and “settlers,” the former gaining rights to
land and tribal government posts, the latter having to give “gifts” to local chiefs in return 
for the use of land.  Camel nomads in the north, who were neither natives nor settlers, 
lacked all claims to land and citizenship and cattle nomads in the south of Darfur 
received land and political rights only if they belonged to large groups that couldn’t be 
ignored.  “Tribe” became an administrative unit, not just a kinship unit. 
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At independence in 1956, the primary political struggle was not between the two 
major political parties, which represented regions and divisions in Islam.  Rather, it was 
between modernizers and traditionalists, with modernization favored by the army, 
merchants, and intellectuals and tradition favored by both major Islamic parties and by 
local chiefs.  Following a colonial rule that fostered so-called tribalism and custom, the 
modernizers saw that democracy could only result in victory for tribally oriented 
traditionalists.  Under the circumstances, military coups were inevitable, but they could 
not easily solve political problems.  The period of Jaffer Nimeiry’s military rule from 
1969-1985 saw efforts to modernize political administration, but it also saw the 
devolution of central power in 1972 in an effort to defuse north-south tensions.  Limited 
autonomy was further extended to Darfur in the east and to other regions in 1980.  In 
Darfur, this autonomy “unleashed internal political competition” and resulted in 
heightened ethnic politics, because citizenship continued to be defined culturally.16
This was the situation at the beginning of the environmental crisis of the early 
1980s.  Over the next two decades, the desert moved southward putting increasing 
pressure on the camel nomads of the north, who claimed Arab ancestry.  Lybia and Chad 
also figure in this story, with Lybia attempting to extend its influence and with Chad torn 
by similar north-south ethnic tensions and trying to maneuver between Lybia, Sudan, and
France.  Growing tensions and the impending Sudanese government agreement to 
provide the non-Muslim south with autonomy and eventual independence (after a 2011 
referendum), prompted the Darfurians to armed revolt in 2003.  The government, unable 
to use the army because of its involvement in the south, began to arm the camel nomads 
and bandits to stop the rebels.  
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But, according to Mamdani, the Darfur conflict was never genocide of “Africans” 
by “Arabs,” as was claimed by the Save Darfur movement.  The central government 
never intended to eliminate or cleanse the Fur or any other ethnic group, nor was all of 
the fighting between so-called Arabs and non-Arabs.  Cattle nomads who were non-
Arabs in southern Darfur, for example, also fought for land during this period.  Moreover,
the number of those killed during the worst part of the crisis and afterwards was highly 
exaggerated by the Save Darfur movement.  In this, they were helped by so-called 
“Africans” (non-Arabs) in Darfur who saw political advantage in Western support and 
thus promoted the Save Darfur exaggeration.  The United States government, says 
Mamdani, was more or less forced—by Save Darfur and by guilt over Rwanda—to 
declare the Darfur conflict genocide.  Thus Darfur became “Arabized” and part of the 
War on Terror, a struggle between so-called Arabs and so-called Africans rather than a 
localized struggle resulting from an environmental crisis, a colonial legacy of exclusivist 
local rule, and an incompetent government.  Mamdani writes, “The War on Terror has 
displaced the history and politics of Darfur while providing the context to interpret and 
illuminate ongoing developments in Darfur.  The more such an interpretation takes root, 
the more Darfur becomes not just an illustration of the grand narrative of the War on 
Terror but also a part of its justification.”17
Mamdani has written extensively about the causes of so-called tribalism in 
contemporary Africa and locates African ethnic conflict primarily in European colonial 
indirect rule.  Almost all of Sub-Saharan Africa was ruled through customary rulers who 
were expected to collect taxes, provide labor for colonial enterprises, and keep public 
order.  Colony-wide laws mostly referred to the colonial sphere of economic exploitation,
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small urban areas, and interethnic affairs.  Citizenship was largely defined as existing 
within “tribal” affiliation and local chiefs using customary law judged so-called tribal 
affairs.  As in Sudan, Europeans thus ruled colonies using two sets of laws and two 
definitions of citizenship, one customary and one for rulers and the few African urbanites
who escaped traditional jurisdictions.  In addition, where Europeans identified different 
races, such as in Sudan, Rwanda, Zanzibar, and South Africa, the colonial state legislated
racial discrimination.  Thus, writes Mamdani, “Racial discrimination in the civic sphere 
reproduced race as a political identity, just as ethnic discrimination in the customary 
sphere translated ethnicity from a cultural to a political identity.”18
Post-independence leaders rarely departed from the colonial order.  To do so 
would have threatened both the stability of rural areas where “customary” rulers held 
sway, and also the power of the new urban elites who largely led Africa to independence. 
Thus unscrupulous tyrants and elites left the tribalized colonial formula for citizenship 
intact and proceeded to manipulate it for their own benefit.  Tanzania stands as a 
significant and rare exception in post-colonial East, Central, and Southern Africa.  There, 
President Julius Nyerere attempted to delineate “a single unified citizenship, both 
deracialized and deethnicized.”19  We should add, so as not to ignore other important 
factors in the construction of citizenship, that Tanzania is different from most African 
countries in that it has many small ethnic groups with no group or groups dominating the 
others.  Thus Tanzania’s experience demonstrates that leadership is only one factor in 
post-colonial history.
There are, of course, many accounts of Africa’s crises and their resolution (or lack
of resolution) that are not culturalist.  For example, there have been excellent analyses 
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that situate Rwanda’s genocide in the late twentieth century instead of merely in racism 
and tribalism.20  Likewise, for Sierra Leone, the place that Robert Kaplan said best 
illustrates the extreme weakness of African culture, Lansana Gberie’s A Dirty War in 
West Africa provides a perspective that is neither culturalist nor hopeless.21  Gérard 
Prunier’s Africa’s World War describes the recent history of Central Africa and while 
emphasizing the role of traditional African culture also takes ample account of outside 
influences and recent developments in regional culture.22  Non-culturalist analyses are 
available for most African conflicts.
***
The essentialist ideas of the culturalists cause more problems than they resolve.  
Culturalists abandon hope in African peace and thus promote Western reactions to 
African conflicts that sustain and perpetuate violence: barbarian morality, survival of the 
fittest, neo-imperialism, neglect, and unjust cultural, economic, and political adjustment 
regimes.  In reality, African cultures respond to incentives and interests just as other 
cultures do.  Indeed, Africans have already undergone cultural and other adjustment 
programs for more than a century, because Africa is not isolated from the rest of the 
world.  While some of African culture is traditional, much has been deeply transformed 
by the modern world.  African history and culture are shaped by the same forces that 
shape the rest of history, including great power politics, modern education, international 
markets and globalization, modern technology (guns, airplanes, radio, television, cell 
phones, Internet…), urbanization, personality, and so forth.  And most African identities 
are based on multiple affiliations including kinship, religion, occupation, gender, 
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geography, and so on.  Despite Africa’s troubles, and sometimes because of them, Africa 
is modernizing, and is reaping the attendant benefits and ills.  
Given ignorance in the West of both history and culture in Africa, it is easy to be 
confused and to confuse.  Thus Westerners have descended on Africa with quick-fix, 
half-considered prescriptions for Africa’s problems.  Or, our leaders purposefully obscure
the truth with culturalism and false histories.  In other words, culturalism and historical 
misinterpretation are not necessarily a result of ignorance and honest error.  In public 
policy, culturalist approaches can justify poor policies and lack of care for Africa.  
During the Cold War, for example, the West and the Soviet Union supported African 
tyrants and justified their violence as a product of African culture.  When the Cold War 
ended, however, the West quickly demanded multi-party democracy, accountability, and 
transparency.23  In a few places this new policy helped foster democratic processes, but in
Rwanda and elsewhere it failed precisely because it used simple formulas in situations 
that the West little understood.  Mamdani writes, “The donor community force-fed 
Rwanda a reform agenda out of a textbook, without regard to the situation on the ground 
and secure in the knowledge that they would not have to suffer the consequences of their 
actions.”24  Later, when the genocide began, the West failed to intervene quickly, even 
when it knew what was going on.  When the genocide ended, the United States supported
a Tutsi regime that reproduced and reproduces the errors of the colonial past.
Similarly, President Clinton sent Jesse Jackson in 1999 to negotiate a settlement 
in the Sierra Leone conflict.  Jackson went to Lomé instead of a senior diplomat because 
the Clinton administration was involved in Kosovo and because it did not take Sierra 
Leone seriously.  Jackson—inept, ignorant, hurried, and egotistical—forced the 
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government to hand over wealth and power to the rebel leader, whom Jackson compared 
to Nelson Mandela, thus prolonging the war.  In fact, the war was over diamonds and was
prosecuted by bandits, not ethnic groups or liberators.  Meanwhile, Clinton denied that 
the United States had dictated the Lomé settlement, a lie that astounded those who were 
present and convinced Sierra Leoneans that the United States could not be trusted.  They 
were right.  Meanwhile, Clinton was telling Americans how important Africa was to the 
United States.25
The Bush administration involvement in the 2006 Darfur negotiations in Abuja, 
Nigeria, had much the same character.  Eager to reach an agreement, impatient with the 
parties, and ignorant of the situation in Darfur, the international actors, especially the 
United States and Britain, forced a settlement that did not include all of the major actors 
and could not have been the basis of a lasting peace.26  In general, the United States 
government tried to do as little to resolve the Darfur conflict as possible.
Mamdani also sees the 2008 indictment of Sudan’s president, Omar Hassan 
Ahmad al-Bashir, by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as part of a United States 
hijacking of the Darfur conflict for the War on Terror.  Under the Bush administration, 
the United States voted in the UN Security Council to refer al-Bashir to the ICC, which 
led to al-Bashir’s indictment in 2008.  By intervening through an international regime of 
justice, the ICC made Darfur more difficult to resolve because, according to Mamdani, it 
substituted absolutist “victors’ justice” for locally based “survivors’ justice.”  To reflect 
on the difference between the two, we might speculate how much more difficult it would 
have been to resolve apartheid in South Africa had white government officials been under
indictment by the ICC.  Given Sudan’s historical and cultural situation, says Mamdani, 
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Sudan would find a more lasting peace through the mediation of “wise persons” rather 
than the victors’ justice of the ICC.27  
Mamdani might be both right and wrong about the ICC in Sudan.  Perhaps the 
United States did see al-Bashir as an actor in the War on Terror.  But subsequent to the 
indictments the government of Sudan has worked to negotiate an end to the conflict 
(despite also ejecting international aid organizations from Darfur), and the Obama 
administration has softened its stance toward the Sudan government.  What remains to be
seen is whether the court’s actions will deter future violence in Sudan and elsewhere.  If 
the court is allowed to be impartial and not become a tool of the big powers, then it might
be useful in resolving and preventing future violent conflict.
In the ongoing conflict in Eastern Congo, the war has claimed far more lives than 
the war in Sudan or the genocide in Rwanda, yet the conflict is almost invisible outside of
Africa.28  With its enormous death toll, why has this conflict not become an international 
cause and why has the world not intervened seriously?  Is our global conscience only 
attuned to genocide?  Does this war not matter to global politics because there are no 
Arabs, nuclear weapons, or oil deposits involved?  Does the United States ignore the war 
because it supports the Tutsi government in Rwanda, which participates in the war?  Is it 
that despite the war the world can continue to purchase the rebel-mined coltan 
(columbite-tantalite; used in cell phones and other electronic devices) and other conflict 
minerals that fuel the war?  Serious intervention would surely be messy because a post-
colonial state has never really established order there, but can we truly say that the 
conflict doesn’t matter as much as that in Sudan? 
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Since the end of the Cold War, Western governments have told their citizens that 
they care about helping Africa resolve its political conflicts.  But if, as they claim, they 
have made their best efforts, then citizens in the West can conclude that Africa’s political 
problems must be too deep-seated to solve.  Such a false conclusion relies on the West’s 
ignorance of African culture and history and can only reinforce culturalism.  In much the 
same way, many Western efforts at African economic and social development have 
fostered culturalism.  Frequently, development projects promote dependency and 
corruption and cannot be sustained by local people once the development agency moves 
on.  Donors want quick results and new projects so that development workers rarely have 
time to understand thoroughly cultures and historical situations.  Moreover, critics say, 
the development workers rather than Africans gain the skills and resources needed for 
development.  Africa is “being developed” rather than developing; ordinary people are 
not learning to solve their own problems.  And when projects eventually fail, it is easier 
to blame Africans and their cultures rather than the misunderstanding, impatience, and 
self-promotion of outsiders.
***
“Tribalization,” “retribalization,” and “underdevelopment” of Africa by European
colonial powers is a common theme in modern histories.  Mamdani’s contribution as a 
political scientist has been to reemphasize the way that colonial policies have carried over
into post-colonial politics.  Europeans established a colonial system in which white elites 
maintained power by conferring citizenship based on culture (and race), and modern 
black elites have largely reproduced this system.  Thus in the context of the colonial and 
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post-colonial state, ethnic tension is inevitable.  This tension is not, however, the age-old 
tension that culturalists propose.  
Would it have been possible to create a colonial state on a non-cultural basis? 
Given the unwillingness of Europeans to invest in the political development of their 
colonies, probably not.  Colonies were primarily economic enterprises meant to extract 
wealth.  However, not all modern cultural tension need be attributed to the exploitative 
structure of colonial or post-colonial states.  Integration of the many precolonial African 
societies into larger political and economic units was bound to cause cultural tension.  
Indeed, such integration and tension had been features of precolonial Africa.  Thus no 
matter what political model colonists applied, cultural integration and conflict were 
inevitably features of colonialism and of post-colonialism.  Indeed, one might even ask 
whether the cost of cultural integration in Africa has been much different from the 
historical costs of integration in other parts of the world.  We should not forget, for 
example, the centuries of violent European conflict that precede our own era.  To ask this 
question does not excuse the exploitation of colonial or post-colonial powers nor make 
future violence inevitable, but it admits that up to now historical change globally has 
often brought terrible violence.
Along with many others, outsiders and insiders alike, Mamdani insists that peace 
in Africa’s multicultural states requires a separation of political and cultural identities.  
Citizenship should be based on one’s place of residence, not on one’s culture.  Peace also 
requires constitutions and state-run judicial systems (not tribal courts) that protect 
individual rights, and, as a prerequisite for participation in government, the renunciation 
of violence.29  But given its century-plus history of zero-sum tribalization and 
16
authoritarianism, most of Africa will move much more slowly in this direction than 
Mamdani envisions.  Just as the culturalists count too little on the flexibility of traditional
cultures and the ability of modern ideas and actors to cause change, Mamdani and others 
seem to count too much on them.  In sub-Saharan Africa, only a very few states have 
established successful political and judicial systems that primarily rely on individual 
rights and substantially exclude cultural politics.  These states are special cases that are 
culturally homogeneous (Botswana), culturally plural with no one large group 
(Tanzania), or semi-modern and class-based (South Africa).  A few other states have 
done moderately well in reducing cultural politics (e.g., Namibia) and establishing 
individual over cultural rights, but the path to Mamdani’s ideal will not be easy or rapid.
To reduce conflict, Africans might best attempt to create multicultural states that 
protect both state unity and cultural identity, both individual and cultural choice.  The 
2004 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program provides 
examples from around the world of states working to protect cultural liberties (such as 
Spain, Belgium, India, New Zealand, and Guatemala).30  Existing models may or may not
work in situations such as Rwanda, where Tutsi and Hutu live side by side, or in Sudan, 
where some cultural groups do not even have access to the resources they need to 
survive, yet Africans should be encouraged to look for models that allow cultural choice 
without providing the basis for cultural chauvinism, aggression, or secession.
In the same way, the West and others who say they want to help Africa need to 
modify their reactions to African conflict.  In Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Sudan, Congo, and elsewhere the West has generally prolonged violent conflict through 
slow, inappropriate, half-hearted, and self-serving interventions.  In some cases, such as 
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Sierra Leone and Liberia, the international community eventually found a combination of
international force and aid that helped build peace, but the overall record of peacemaking 
by the West and others is dismal.  Given the ignorance of African culture and history in 
the West and among outsiders in general, it is still possible for those who say they are 
trying to resolve African conflict to obscure their lack of care or incompetence with false 
pictures of culture and history.  Thus we cannot yet hold our governments, international 
organizations, development agencies, churches, multinational corporations, and media 
accountable for actually helping Africa.  
While traditions of small-scale and regionalized cultures still exist in African 
states, we must not abandon Africa or any other part of the world to culturalist pessimism
and ahistoricism.  The events of the twentieth century taught some people in Africa how 
to gain power and wealth by emphasizing cultural difference, but no culture is inevitably 
tribalist or violent.  Indeed, the twentieth century should also have taught us that in a 
technologically advanced age the emotions of tribalism and nationalism must be 
abandoned everywhere so that we do not destroy ourselves.  To survive, we must build 
global and local cultures and structures that promote care, cooperation, and justice rather 
than conflict and self-interest.  Fortunately, all cultures have resources—traditions, 
creative individuals, outside influences—that allow them to respond to history in peaceful
as well as violent ways.  It is our responsibility—that of the West, Africa, and the rest of 
world—to develop the cultural and structural resources for peace.
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